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Poland launches second signals intelligence ship ORP Henryk Zygalski for Baltic Sea patrols

Polish navy warship sailing on calm water with several crew members on deck and cranes in background.

Poland has put to sea its second purpose-built signals intelligence vessel, adding to a deliberately low-profile yet increasingly vital capability as military activity and strain intensify around the Baltic Sea.

New spy ship joins Poland’s baltic fleet

On 14 January 2026, the Polish Navy reached another milestone in its modernisation drive when ORP Henryk Zygalski was launched in Gdańsk. She is the second and final signals intelligence (SIGINT) ship being produced for Poland under the “DELFIN” programme, led by Swedish defence company Saab.

Her sister ship, ORP Jerzy Różycki, entered the water on 1 July 2025. With both hulls now launched, attention shifts to a lengthy and technically complex period of fitting out and trials before either vessel can begin routine operational patrols.

ORP Henryk Zygalski is the second and last SIGINT ship in Poland’s DELFIN programme, cementing a new national capability at sea.

When their mission suites are fully installed, the two ships will function as seaborne listening stations. Their role is to detect, monitor and interpret electronic activity across the maritime domain, ranging from radar patterns to encrypted radio transmissions.

Saab and Poland deepen defence ties

Saab is acting as the prime contractor for DELFIN, combining Swedish expertise with Polish industrial capacity at a moment when regional defence collaboration is becoming more pressing. The physical construction is being carried out in Gdańsk by Remontowa Shipbuilding S.A., one of the country’s largest and most experienced yards.

Saab is being supported by Polish design house MMC, alongside other domestic defence suppliers providing specialist equipment and subsystems. Even so, Saab remains fully accountable for integrating the sophisticated mission systems that transform a standard hull into a working intelligence platform.

The DELFIN project is as much about industrial cooperation and technology transfer as it is about adding two hulls to the Polish fleet.

Handovers to the Polish Navy are expected to take place progressively. Following the installation of sensitive electronic equipment and a prolonged programme of sea trials, deliveries are planned for 2027 and 2028.

What a SIGINT ship actually does

Signals intelligence is among the least visible-and most valuable-elements of contemporary military activity. Rather than firing weapons or deploying aircraft, these ships focus on listening.

With antenna arrays, receivers and high-powered computing on board, a SIGINT platform can intercept, store and analyse a broad spectrum of electronic signals, such as:

  • Naval and coastal radar emissions used to track ships and aircraft
  • Military and government radio communications
  • Data links connecting ships, aircraft and ground forces
  • Electronic signatures produced by weapons, sensors and related systems

By observing these emissions over time, analysts can assemble detailed profiles of foreign forces. This can reveal where radars are positioned, how frequently units train, which frequencies are in use, and how rapidly a navy or air force reacts to developments close to its borders.

For a coastal country such as Poland-operating in a busy Baltic shared with Russia, Germany, Sweden and other NATO states-this level of situational awareness is especially valuable.

From raw signals to usable intelligence

Intercepting emissions is only the starting point; the real payoff comes from converting raw captures into clear judgments that decision-makers can use.

Stage What happens
Detection Ship sensors pick up radar pulses, radio traffic or data bursts.
Classification Systems compare signals against known libraries to identify likely sources.
Analysis Specialists assess patterns, locations and technical characteristics.
Reporting Findings are sent to national and allied intelligence centres in near real-time.

When a SIGINT ship is deployed, this loop runs constantly. The outcome is an ongoing stream of insight into who is operating at sea, where they are, and the way they conduct their activities.

Why the Baltic Sea is such a sensitive stage

The Baltic Sea has evolved into one of Europe’s most closely monitored security flashpoints. Russia’s Kaliningrad exclave-wedged between Poland and Lithuania-is heavily militarised, fielding advanced air-defence assets and coastal missile systems. NATO drills occur regularly, while submarines and surveillance aircraft from multiple countries move throughout the area.

In such conditions, missing a radar emission or failing to identify a transmission can translate into a lost advantage-or an unwelcome shock. Poland’s new SIGINT ships are intended to help prevent that.

By extending its electronic “ears” out to sea, Poland aims to spot unusual activity earlier and understand it better.

The vessels are also expected to bolster NATO’s wider situational awareness. Although particulars remain classified, information collected by Polish platforms can contribute to alliance-level intelligence reporting, reinforcing the shared understanding of Russian and other regional military behaviour.

From launch to operational service

A launch is a prominent landmark, but the most sensitive work follows afterwards. Over the coming months and years, ORP Henryk Zygalski and her sister ship will receive banks of specialist equipment designed to be protected against interference-and unwanted scrutiny.

The sea-trial phase will examine more than core ship functions such as propulsion, navigation and stability. It will also assess how effectively sensor masts perform in harsh weather, amid electromagnetic interference, and within heavy civilian traffic.

Ship’s companies will require extensive preparation, both afloat and via simulators, to operate complex workstations, cope with large volumes of data, and coordinate effectively with shore-based intelligence centres.

Names that carry a story

The names chosen for the two ships are deliberate and historically resonant. Henryk Zygalski and Jerzy Różycki were members of the Polish group that broke early forms of the German Enigma cipher before and during the Second World War.

By commemorating these codebreakers, Poland is linking past cryptologic success to today’s technology-driven intelligence missions. The intended message is straightforward: listening, decoding and interpretation have long sat at the heart of the nation’s defence culture.

How SIGINT ships fit into wider maritime operations

Signals intelligence ships seldom operate in isolation; they both support and are supported by other assets. In a Baltic crisis, a Polish SIGINT vessel could:

  • Track foreign naval forces from a safe distance while charting their electronic behaviour
  • Offer early warning of unusual activity to coastal missile units and air-defence forces
  • Pass information to allied aircraft and drones assigned to confirm targets visually
  • Help monitor submarines by observing related surface and air movements

In peacetime, these same ships are likely to spend long stretches on routine patrols, establishing a baseline picture of what “normal” looks like. That reference makes it easier to identify meaningful shifts when tensions increase.

Key terms and risks worth understanding

Several expressions associated with projects such as DELFIN can be hard to interpret. “Maritime electronic intelligence” describes the gathering of electronic emissions generated in the maritime setting, including those from ships, coastal sites and aircraft operating over water.

The wider term “SIGINT” includes communications intelligence (COMINT), focused on spoken or written messages, and electronic intelligence (ELINT), which concentrates primarily on non-communicative emissions such as radar.

These capabilities also bring risk. Antenna arrays and distinctive topside profiles can make such ships conspicuous targets in wartime. Opponents may try to jam sensors, feed false signals, or overload collection systems. Legal and political complications can also arise when operating close to disputed or sensitive waters, even where the ship remains within international law.

Set against that, the advantages are considerable. A single SIGINT platform can watch a large area without crossing borders, collecting information that may be difficult to obtain from land-based systems alone. Combined with satellites, drones and coastal monitoring stations, it becomes part of a layered intelligence architecture.

That architecture will not prevent conflict on its own. However, it can provide leaders and commanders with earlier warning, richer context and a broader range of choices. Poland’s investment in two specialised SIGINT ships-delivered with Saab and supported by a network of domestic firms-signals a long-term commitment to information as a central component of Baltic security.

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